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COMMENT
COPYRIGHTS, CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
AND ECONOMIC RENTS: APPLYING
THE RENT SEEKING MODEL




Few, if any, public choice theorists' have applied the rent seeking
model2 to the criminal law formulation process.3 This is particularly
* David Haddock and Fred McChesney provided invaluable comments on earlier
drafts. Any remaining errors are solely the responsibility of the author.
1 Public choice is defined as the economic study of non-market decision making, or
simply the application of economics to political phenomena. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC
CHOICE II: A REVISED EDITION OF PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1989). In other words, public choice
theorists use microeconomic models to examine political markets:
Traditional economic theory studies how the interactions of large numbers of self-
interest-seeking producers and consumers in ordinary private markets determine out-
comes such as prices, quantities, incomes, and profits; modem public-choice theory
studies how the interactions of large numbers of self-interest-seeking demanders, sup-
pliers, and brokers of wealth transfers in political markets determine outcomes such as
tax rates, income subsidies, and regulatory intervention.
William F. Shughart II, Public-Choice Theory and Antitrust Policy, in THE CAUSES AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECrVE 10 (Fred S. McChesney & William
F. Shughart II eds., 1995).
2 Rent seeking was first discussed systematically by Gordon Tullock. See Gordon Tul-
lock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 WESTERN ECON.J. 224 (1967) [here-
inafter Welfare Costs]. The actual term "rent seeking" was introduced by Anne Krueger. See
Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 291
(1974). Professor Mueller provides a useful definition:
The government can, for example, help create, increase, or protect a group's monop-
oly position. In doing so, the government increases the monopoly rents [i.e., "prof-
its"] of the favored groups, at the expense of the buyers of the group's products or
services. The monopoly rents that the government can help provide are a prize worth
pursuing, and the pursuit of these rents has been given the name rent seeking.
MUELLER, supra note 1, at 229. For a complete discussion of the rent seeking model, see
infra Part III.
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odd given that rent seeking is such a prevalent model in examining
the formulation of civil legislation. 4 On first inspection, public choice
theorists may posit that the benefits of criminal law are public goods.5
For example, streets which are free from criminal activity offer bene-
fits that are nonexcludable and nonrivalrous. Accordingly, interest
groups have little incentive to organize on the ground that the bene-
fits of their collective action would be available to the public at large,
yet they would have to bear the entire cost of organization. This may
well be true for some aspects of criminal law, in particular policies of
general deterrence. On closer inspection, however, there are areas of
criminal law which enable organized interests to use the mechanism
of government to create or protect economic rents. These areas lend
themselves to rent seeking analysis.
In order to clarify the argument, this Comment will examine the
changing nature of copyright law. Copyright law is making increased
use of criminal sanctions to punish transgressions. 6 Prior to 1976, for
example, the maximum criminal sanction for the willful infringement
of a copyright by an individual constituted a misdemeanor penalty of
$1,000 and one year in prison.7 After 1992, by contrast, the maximum
criminal sanction for the willful infringement of a copyright by an in-
dividual constituted a felony penalty of $250,000 and five years in
3 A number of economists and public choice theorists have applied microeconomic
models to criminal law. These applications, however, almost exclusively focus on price
theory and its impact upon criminal behavior, optimal deterrence or rule enforcement.
See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & GeorgeJ. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation
of Enforcers, 3(1) J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: AnEconomic
Approach, 76J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
4 The list of public choice literature addressing rent seeking through the use of civil
legislation is extensive. For a useful overview, however, see GORDON Tu.TOcK, THE Eco-
NOMICs OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT SEEKING (1989); TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-
SEEKING SOCImT (James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1980).
5 Public goods have two characteristics: nonexcludability of would-be consumers and
nonrivalrous consumption. Nonexcludability means that if one person consumes the
good, it cannot feasibly be withheld from all other persons. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION 14 (1965). Nonrivalrous means that one person's consumption of the
good does not diminish another person's consumption of the same good, or equivalently,
the marginal cost of supplying the good to an additional individual is zero. Paul Samuel-
son, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. OF ECON. & STAT. 387, 389'(1954). The
classic example of a pure public good is national defense, namely, once it is provided it is
impossible or infeasible to exclude people from the benefits and the cost of protecting an
additional individual is zero. JOSEPH E. STIGLrrZ, THE EC6NOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECrOR
121-23 (1986).
6 See infra Part II. See generally Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 221-27 (1985)
(describing the evolution over the last century of broader and stiffer criminal penalties for
copyright infringement); MaryJane Saunders, Criminal Coyright Infringement and the Copy-
right Felony Act, 71 DENY. U. L. REv. 671 (1994); Carl H. Loewenson, Jr. & Marta E. Nelson,
Congress Toughens Criminal Copyright Law, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 13, 1992, at 1.
7 For a complete discussion of the pre-1976 criminal copyright law, see infra Part II.
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prison (for first time offenders) and ten years (for second time of-
fenders) .8 Thus, there has been a clear and dramatic shift toward stif-
fer and more stringent criminal penalties for copyright infringement.
This Comment posits that the traditional public choice model of
rent seeking can explain the increase in criminal sanctions for copy-
right infringements. As the value of intellectual property rights has
increased with the emergence of new technology, particularly in the
area of computer software, the incentives for interests to expend re-
sources in order to gain monopolies over these products have also
increased.9 This Comment argues that Congress' decision to increase
criminal penalties was driven by interest groups seeking copyrights
protected by criminal sanctions as a means of restricting entry into an
increasingly profitable market. Indeed, given the nature of intellec-
tual property, criminal sanctions are the most effective means of re-
stricting competition and realizing economic rents. Thus, this
Comment extends the methodology of public choice from the civil to
8 For a complete discussion of the post-1992 criminal copyright law, see infra notes 73-
80 and accompanying text.
9 The assumption is that a copyright confers a monopoly position over the copyrighted
material. There are three distinct systems for granting property rights in ideas: patents;
trademarks; and copyrights. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAWv AND ECONOMICS 135
(1988). The distinguishing "[elconomic characteristics of each of these methods for estab-
lishing property rights in information is that they are monopoly rights." Id. (emphasis in
original). Specifically relating to copyrights, SJ. Leibowitz concludes that, "[i]ntellectual
property law, by providing the copyright holder ownership over the intellectual product,
provides a degree of monopoly power to these individuals. The lack of competition in the
reproduction or use of the intellectual product allows greater remuneration to the copy-
right holder than would otherwise be the case." SJ. Leibowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying
and Price Discrimination, 8 RES. LAw & EcoN. 181, 184 (1986). As a practical matter, there
seems to be a spectrum between those copyrighted materials for which there are no substi-
tutes and those for which there are near perfect substitutes. See William W. Fisher III,
Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1659, 1702-03 (1988). Accordingly,
copyright confers a degree of monopoly power, and it gives greater monopoly power to
some creators than others.
By contrast, some authors argue that copyrights do not confer monopoly positions
over the copyrighted material. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in
the Intellectual Property Protection of Software, 24J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 335-37 (1995). This does
not, however, eliminate the possibility of rent seeking. Copyright holders enjoy economic
rent. Indeed, Professor Dam recognizes this position when he opines that, "[t]he fact that
the grant of intellectual property may permit the innovator to enjoy economic rent sug-
gests that rent seeking may be a problem." Id. at 337 (but noting that certain copyright
doctrines reduce the rent seeking threat); see also Kenneth W. Darn, The Economic Underpin-
nings of Patent Law, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 250 (1994) (arguing that patents do not consti-
tute monopolies, but noting that "many patents, especially those that achieve commercial
success, do result in the patentee enjoying the economic rent."). Therefore, even if copy-
rights are not monopolies, and Professor Dam is correct in asserting that certain copyright
doctrines may reduce the problem of rent seeking, it nonetheless seems reasonable to
assert that positive economic rent provides a sufficient incentive for interest groups to mo-
bilize and seek to capture and protect these rents.
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the criminal law formulation process. To public choice theorists such
an argument may not seem particularly controversial. To legal schol-
ars, however, such thinking may be quite revolutionary.
The fundamental purpose of the Comment is thus to demon-
strate that the criminal law formulation process does not occur in a
political vacuum; namely, it is not a frictionless process void of interest
group activity. Given that quotas, tariffs and regulations are coveted
by economic interests,' 0 it would seem reasonable to suggest that cer-
tain criminal sanctions are also coveted by economic interests. The
secondary purpose of the Comment is to suggest that copyright pro-
tection may be inappropriate for certain works. Specifically, govern-
ment-conferred copyrights enable the holder to realize economic
rents, and these rents offer an incentive for interest groups to expend
resources in order to gain these copyrights. This process of rent seek-
ing means that there are greater costs associated with the current sys-
tem of copyrights than the present literature suggests. Indeed, when
these costs are factored into the equation, the benefits of copyright
protection may not, on balance, outweigh the costs. It is important to
emphasize, however, that the Comment's analysis is predominately
positive (i.e., non-normative) and specific policy choices are beyond
its scope.
In order to develop the above thesis, section II explores the in-
creasingly criminal nature of copyright law and the legislative history
behind the three most recent amendments to the Copyright Act. Sec-
tion III explains the rent seeking model in some detail. Section IV
gives a brief overview of the economics of intellectual property. Sec-
tion V discusses the need for criminal sanctions as a means of deter-
ring entry into a lucrative market for copyrighted material. This
section applies the rent seeking model to the legislative history of the
Copyright Act. Section V does not claim to prove a causal connection
between interest group demands and the resulting law, but rather a
conceptual correlation." Some readers may view this section as pure
assertion, and indeed, there is considerable scope for future research.
This Comment, far from being the final word on the phenomenon of
rent seeking in the area of copyright law, is meant to suggest the need
for empirical research and further study. Finally, Section VI
concludes.
10 See, e.g., GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Theoy of Economic Regulation, 2 BEL.J. EcoN. 3 (1971).
11 A further qualification is that the Comment does not use statistical analysis.




II. THE INCREASE IN CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
For more than one hundred years, the federal government did
not impose criminal penalties for copyright infringement.' 2 In 1897,
Congress amended the federal copyright law and, for the first time,
promulgated criminal sanctions for those who infringed protected
copyrights.13 The actions giving rise to criminal sanctions, however,
were limited to unlawful performances and representations of copy-
righted dramatic and musical compositions. The newly amended
Copyright Act provided, "[i]f the unlawful performance and represen-
tation be willful and for profit, such person or persons shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be imprisoned for a pe-
riod not exceeding one year."14 Other forms of copyright infringe-
ment such as the unauthorized reproduction or distribution of a
copyrighted work continued to be resolved through civil litigation. 15
The first attempt to broaden criminal sanctions for copyright in-
fringement occurred during the general copyright revision of 1909.16
The process that led to the Copyright Act of 190917 was driven by in-
dustry representatives with a vested interest in copyright law.', In or-
der to revise the copyright laws, the Librarian of Congress convened a
series of conferences.19 Invited to the conferences were representa-
tives of industries protected by copyright legislation.20 The draft bill
generated out of these conferences, however, encountered opposition
12 The focus of the Comment is on federal statutory law. Although copyright law in the
United States developed along the parallel tracks of federal statutory and state common
law, Congress, pursuant to the Copyright Act of 1976, chose to preempt the field, effec-
tively ending a dichotomy that had receivedjudicial approval for a century and a half. See 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, OV-3 (1995). For a short and concise history
of the early state and federal copyright law, see Bernard A. Grossman, Cycles in Copyright, 22
N.Y.L. SIH. L. Ray. 653, 658-66 (1977).
13 Act of Jan. 6, 1897, 29 Stat. 481, reprinted in 5 NIMMER, supra note 12, at App. 7-92
[21].
14 Id.
15 Saunders, supra note 6, at 673.
16 Id.
17 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, reprinted in 5 NIMMER, supra note 12, at App. 6-1.
The Copyright Act of 1909, as amended, continued to be effective through December 31,
1977 until the Copyright Act of 1976 came into effect on January 1, 1978. The Copyright
Act of 1909 continues to govern pre-1978 causes of action. Id., v.1, at OV-1.
18 See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv.
275, 278 (1989) [hereinafter Copyright Legislation] (finding that "[C]ongress and the Copy-
right Office have settled on a scheme for statutory drafting that features meetings and
negotiations among representatives of industries with interests in copyright. That scheme
dominated copyright revision during the legislative process that led to the enactment of
the 1909 Copyright Act.").
19 Id. at 284.
20 Id.
1474 [Vol. 87
1997] COPYRIGHTS, SANCTIONS & ECONOMIC RENTS
from other interest groups not represented at the conferences. 21 This
conflict was resolved by subsequent negotiations between the various
groups, and it was this interest group compromise that became the
1909 statute. 22 The 1909 Copyright Act applied criminal infringe-
ment provisions to all types of copyrighted works except sound re-
cordings.23 The Act provided misdemeanor penalties of up to one
year in jail or a fine between $100 and $1,000, or both, for "any per-
son who willfully and for profit" infringed upon a protected
copyright.2 4
By 1971, there was a substantial increase in unauthorized record
and tape duplication. For example, the House of Representatives Ju-
diciary Committee estimated that the annual volume of unauthorized
record and tape duplication exceeded $100 million.2 5 The Commit-
tee traced the problem to the exclusion of sound recordings from
criminal copyright infringement provisions.2 6 As Mary Jane Saunders
notes, "[i] n response to demands from the sound recording industry,
Congress extended general federal copyright protection to sound re-
cordings with the Sound Recording Act of 1971."27 Criminal sanc-
tions, for the first time, were available against those who willfully and
for profit infringement upon the copyright of protected sound
recordings.
Apart from the Sound Recording Act of 1971, which represented
an incremental adjustment, criminal copyright law remained largely
unchanged from the original Copyright Act of 1909.28 Indeed, in
1976 the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee noted that
"[t]he present copyright law .. . is basically the same as the act of
1909."29 There had been, however, dramatic changes in technology.
Since 1909, a wide range of new techniques for capturing and commu-
nicating printed matter, visual images and recorded sounds had
21 Id. at 286. This opposition was driven by the not surprisingly one-sided nature of the
draft bill. As Professor Litman notes, "[t]he copyright bill produced by the conferences
conferred significant advantages upon composers and music publishers, who had partici-
pated, at the expense of the piano roll and talking machine [phonograph] industries,
which had not." I&
22 Id. at 287.
23 Saunders, supra note 6, at 673. See also Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 221
n.14 (1985).
24 Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 28, 54 Stat. 1075 (codified and amended as § 104),
reprinted in 5 NIMMER, supra note 12, at App. 6-36.
25 H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567.
26 Id.
27 Saunders, supra note 6, at 674 (citing Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat.
391).




emerged.30 These technical advances generated new industries and
new methods for the reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted
works. 31
Despite the rapid change in technology and the growth of new
information-based industries, Congress did not provide a comprehen-
sive revision of the copyright law until 1976.32 The legislative history
behind the Copyright Act of 197633 is long and complex.34 There
were more than thirty studies, three reports issued by the Register of
Copyrights, four panel discussions issued as committee prints, six se-
ries of subcommittee hearings, eighteen committee reports, and the
introduction of at least nineteen general revision bills over a period of
more than twenty years.35
Most commentators agree that the final version of the Act was the
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 The reason for the delay was not for want of trying. Indeed, there were proposals
and efforts to revamp the copyright law for more than 20 years. Id. The fundamental
barriers to change were conflicting sectional interests. In his 1965 testimony to the Senate
Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Abraham Kaminstein, Register of
Copyrights, explained:
[Before] the House Judiciary Committee earlier this year a question was raised as to
why, in view of the fast-evolving communications technology, there have not been
more frequent revisions of the copyright law. If there is a single answer to this ques-
tion, I believe it is that there are so many interrelated creator-user interests in the
copyright field, and they present such sharp conflicts on individual issues, that the
consensus necessary for any general revision is extremely difficult to achieve. Exam-
ples of this difficulty are found throughout the concentrated efforts to revise the 1909
act which went on continuously between 1924 and 1940 and which all ended in failure
and futility. Realizing fully what copyright law revision is up against, Arthur Fisher, my
predecessor as Register of Copyrights, planned a program that would be based on a
thorough knowledge of all the issues and a painstaking effort to resolve as many dis-
putes as possible before a bill reached the stage of congressional hearings. It took us
10 years, but the program he planned has been carried out to the best of our ability.
Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and
Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on theJudidary, 89th Cong. 66 (1965).
33 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1101), reprinted in 5 NIMMER, supra note 12, at App. 2-1.
34 For an excellent, in-depth examination of the legislative history behind the Copy-
right Act of 1976, see Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 857 (1987).
The legislative materials disclose a process of continuing negotiations among various
industry representatives, designed and supervised by Congress and the Copyright Of-
fice and aimed at forging a modem copyright statute from a negotiated consensus.
During more than twenty years of negotiations, the substantive content of the statute
emerged as a series of interrelated and dependent compromises among industries
with differing interests in copyright. The record demonstrates that members of Con-
gress chose to enact compromises whose wisdom they doubted because of their belief
that, in this area of law, the solution of compromise was the best solution.
Id. at 862. See also Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 159-61 (1985) (noting that the
1976 Act was the culmination of twenty years of congressional hearings); Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 462-63 n.9 (1984) (same).
35 Litman, supra note 34, at 865.
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result of interest group negotiations and compromise through con-
gressional institutional structures.3 6 As Professor Litman observed,
"[m] ost of the statutory language was not drafted by members of Con-
gress or their staffs at all."'a 7 Rather, the language evolved through a
process of negotiation among authors, publishers, and other parties
with economic interests in the property rights that the statute cre-
ated.38 Indeed, by the time the House and Senate subcommittees be-
gan holding hearings on copyright revision legislation, the
participants in the pre-hearing negotiations had reached agreement
on the bill's basic structure.3 9 "Members of 'Congress openly acknowl-
edged their limited substantive expertise and their largely supervisory
role in the drafting process." 40
The Copyright Act further expanded the scope and amount of
36 Id. at 861-62. See also Litman, Copyright Legislation, supra note 18, at 281. As Litman
notes:
Congress and the Copyright Office [as in the Copyright Act of 1909] again depended
on negotiations among representatives of an assortment of interests affected by copy-
right to draft a copyright bill. During twenty-one years of inter-industry squabbling,
the private parties to the ongoing negotiations settled on a strategy for the future that
all of them could support.
Id. at 281. See also Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts On The Copyright Act of 1976,22 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 477, 482 (1977) ("[t]he law as a whole bespeaks concern for literally hundreds of
contending and overlapping special interests from every conceivable segment of our plu-
ralistic society.").
37 Litman, supra note 34, at 860-61.
38 Id at 861.
39 Id. at 873.
40 Id. at 880. Although Professor Litman's account of the legislative history leading to
the various Copyright Act revisions is being used by this Comment, it is important to note
that she would not necessarily agree with its thesis. Indeed, Professor Litman labels the
public choice argument the "market model." She frames the market model as follows:
Recently, some commentators have suggested that courts should view statutes as nego-
tiated, enforceable bargains between lobbyists and legislators. They see the legislative
process as a 'market' in which special interests barter campaign contributions, votes,
and endorsements in return for favorable legislation. Courts, they argue, should inter-
pret and enforce at least some statutes as if they were integrated contracts.
Id. at 880 (citing William Landes & Richard Posner, The IndependentJudiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975)). Professor Litman criticizes the "market"
model and argues that it applies poorly to the 1976 Copyright Act. Id. at 881. Specifically,
the negotiated bargains were not being struck between legislatures and interest groups, but
among industrial representatives because Congress forced the competing interests to sit
down and negotiate. Id. Professor Litman misses the mark somewhat. Public choice theo-
rists do not posit a simple model where an interest approaches a member of Congress for
legislation, and the member acquiesces. Rather, a rent seeking model explained in detail
below, see infra Part III, suggests that there is considerable competition between the inter-
ests themselves for favorable legislation. Indeed, the biggest opposition to favorable group
legislation is other competing interest groups. See generally Gary S. Becker, Public Policies,
Pressure Groups, and Deadweight Costs, 28 J. PUB. EcoN. 329 (1985), reprinted in GEORGE STIG-
LR, CHICAGO STuruiEs 1N PoLrCAL ECONOMY 85 (1988); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More
General Theory of Regulation, 19J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976), reprinted in STIGLER, supra, at 234.
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criminal sanctions for copyright infringement. 41 The 1976 Act
amended the criminal provisions of copyright law in two significant
ways. 4 2 First, the 1976 Act relaxed the mens rea required for criminal
copyright infringement. Instead of proof that the infringement was
done willfully and for profit, the offense of criminal infringement now
only required conduct which was done "willfully and for the purpose
of commercial advantage or private financial gain."43
Second, the 1976 Act increased the criminal sanctions for copy-
right infringement. Persons convicted of the misdemeanor offense of
criminal infringement under the Act faced a maximum of $10,000 or
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.44 In the case of
sound recordings or motion pictures, the courts could increase the
fine to $25,000.4 5 Repeat offenders faced increased fines of not more
than $50,000 or imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.46
In addition to the above changes, "[u]pon conviction of criminal
copyright infringement, the 1976 Act provided for the forfeiture, de-
struction, or disposition of all infringing copies or phonorecords and
all implements, devices, or equipment used in the manufacture of
such infringing copies or phonorecords. ''47 The Act made forfeiture
and destruction mandatory for criminal copyright infringement but
discretionary with the courts in civil actions.
During the mid and late 1970s, two trade associations, the Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc. (MPAA) and the Recording In-
41 It is interesting to note that despite the urging of representatives of the film industry,
see Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R 2223 Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice, 94th Cong., at 716 (1975) (statement of Jack Va-
lenti, president of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.), and the initial inclina-
tion of the Senate, see S. REP. No. 94-437 at 146 (1975), Congress declined to provide
felony penalties for copyright infringement involving sound recordings and motion pic-
tures. As noted in the text, Congress did increase the amount and scope of criminal penal-
ties, but felony penalties would not be adopted for another six years.
42 Saunders, supra note 6, at 674.
43 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1978). The 1976 Act does not mandate evidence that the de-
fendant actually realized commercial advantage or private financial gain, only that the de-
fendant's activity or activities were for the purpose of financial gain or benefit. See United
States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a video store sales assistant's
assertion that she, as a store employee and not the owner, realized no commercial advan-
tage or private financial gain from alleged conspiracy, nevertheless did not preclude liabil-
ity for criminal copyright infringement).
44 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1978).
45 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1978).
46 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1)(c) (1988), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (Supp. IV 1992).
47 Saunders, supra note 6, at 675 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1978)). See also Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 n.15 (1984) (observing that
.anyone who willfully infringes the copyright to reproduce a motion picture for purposes
of financial gain is subject to substantial criminal penalties, and the fruits and instrumen-
talities of the crime are forfeited upon conviction.").
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dustry Association of America, Inc. (RIAA), organized an effort to in-
crease the penalties for film and record unauthorized duplication. 48
In 1979, the MPAA and the RIAA reported that even though the mo-
tion picture and sound recording industries were spending upward of
$1 million a year to investigate and prosecute unauthorized duplica-
tion through civil action, the occurrence of such duplication re-
mained widespread. 49
The motion picture and sound recording industries wanted Con-
gress to adopt, for the first time, felony penalties for certain forms of
copyright infringement. Their basic concerns were twofold. First,
civil infringement actions had no deterrent effect on sophisticated
persons engaged in unauthorized duplication. In a joint statement
before the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Law, the MPAA and the
RIAA opined that the "[e]xisting criminal penalties do not deter
counterfeiters and pirates. A first offense is only a misdemeanor, a
very small risk in light of the enormous profits to be made."'50 Second,
the penalties prescribed under existing law tended to discourage
criminal enforcement efforts. 51 The U.S. Attorney, confronted with a
wide range of possible prosecutions, preferred the prospect of almost
any felony conviction to misdemeanor conviction for copyright
infringement.52
In 1982, Congress responded to the efforts of the motion picture
and sound recording industries by restructuring, and moreover, in-
creasing the sanctions for criminal copyright infringement. 53 The of-
fense of criminal infringement was still defined in § 506(a) of Tide 17;
the penalties, however, were placed in new § 2319 of Tide 18. Fur-
ther, certain acts of criminal copyright infringement were increased to
felony offenses.54 The first felony provisions that were created for
criminal copyright infringement involved reproduction or distribu-
tion of records, motion pictures and audiovisual works. These felony
provisions provided for substantial sanctions and were based on a
formula of time periods and numerical thresholds of infringing copies
48 Saunders, supra note 6, at 675.
49 See Hearings on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., at 10694 (1979) (joint statement of the MFAA and RIAA). The MPAA and the
RIAA estimated that by 1979 "all forms of record and film counterfeiting and piracy" were
draining more than "$650 million annually from legitimate sales and rentals in both indus-
tries." Id. at 10697.
50 Hearings on the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1981 (S. 691) Before the Senate




53 Act of May 24, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 97th Cong., 96 Stat. 91.
54 Saunders, supra note 6, at 676.
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or phonorecords reproduced or distributed.55
For example, if the defendant was convicted of reproducing or
distributing, during any 180-day period, "at least one thousand pho-
norecords or copies infringing the copyright in one or more sound
recordings," or "at least sixty-five copies infringing the copyright in
one or more motion pictures or other audiovisual works," or the con-
viction was a second offense, the court could impose a fine not more
than $250,000, a sentence not more than five years, or both.56 The
same maximum fine of $250,000, but a less serve sentence of not more
than two years, or both, was prescribed for criminal infringement in-
volving "the reproduction or distribution, during any one one-hun-
dred-and-eighty day period, of more than one hundred but less than
one thousand phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright in one
or more sound recordings," or "more than seven but less than sixty-
five copies infringing the copyright in one or more motion pictures or
other audiovisual works. 57
Even after these new felony sanctions were enacted, most crimi-
nal copyright infringement remained a misdemeanor offense. For ex-
ample, in "any other case" of criminal copyright infringement the
penalty was a fine of not more than $25,000, or imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both. 58 Thus, the misdemeanor penalty was
applicable to criminal infringement of any works other than the afore-
mentioned sound recordings, motion pictures and other audiovisual
works. The misdemeanor penalty was also the penalty to be applied to
criminal infringement of sound recordings, motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, if the number of infringing copies fell below
the statutory numerical thresholds.
In the wake of legislation increasing the criminal penalties for
copyright infringement involving motion pictures, sound recordings
and audiovisual works, the computer software industry became aware
that it had a problem with large scale unauthorized duplication of
software programs. 59 When the penalties were increased for unau-
55 Id.
56 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (1) (1988), incorporated by reference in 17 U.S.C. § 506(a), as
amended by the Act of May 24, 1982 (Pub. L. 97-180).
57 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (2) (1988), incorporated by reference in 17 U.S.C. § 506(a), as
amended by the Act of May 24, 1982 (Pub. L. 97-180).
58 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (3) (1988), incorporated by reference in 17 U.S.C. § 506(a), as
amended by Act of May 24, 1982 (Pub. L. 97-180).
59 See Criminal Sanctions for Violations of Software Copyright: Hearings on S.893 Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property andJudicial Admin. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong. 27 (1992) (prepared statement of Gail Penner on behalf of the Software Publishers
Association) ("[w]e estimate that revenue lost to software piracy in the U.S. was $2.4 billion
in 1990, the last year for which we have statistics.").
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thorized duplication of motion pictures and sound recordings, the
computer software industry did not enjoy a mass market, and indeed,
was only in its infancy stage of development. 60 By the late 1980s, how-
ever, the software industry had emerged as one of the fastest growing
sectors of the U.S. economy.6 1
Accordingly, the software and video game industries, following
the example set by the motion picture and sound recording indus-
tries, turned to Congress. 62 These industries based their call for fel-
ony sanction on the same reasons that previous industries did, namely,
the system of civil and misdemeanor sanctions did not deter large
scale unauthorized duplication and did not provide incentives for fed-
eral prosecutors. 63 Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Ut) and Dennis DeCon-
cini (D-Az) initiated Senate Bill 893, to create felony sanctions for
willful violation of copyrighted software.64
As originally drafted, Senate Bill 893 applied only to software.
Senator Hatch's bill amended § 2319 of Title 18, and provided that
the reproduction or distribution of fifty or more infringing copies of
computer software over a 180-day period would be punishable with up
to a five-year prison term and a $250,000 fine.65 The reproduction of
ten to forty-nine copies within that same period would be punishable
by a fine of up to $250,000 and/or two years in prison.66 Other viola-
tions would be punishable by up to a $25,000 fine and/or one year in
prison.67
The Subcommittee on Intellectual Property andJudicial Adminis-
tration, House Judiciary Committee, held hearings on Senate Bill
893.68 Testimony at the hearing was received from representatives of
the computer software and video game industries.69 After this hear-
60 I& at 26.
61 Id.
62 Saunders, supra note 6, at 679.
63 See Criminal Sanctions for Violations of Software Copyight, supra note 59, at 26-34.




68 See Criminal Sanctions for Violations of Software Copyright supra note 59.
69 Id. Testifying at the Subcommittee hearing on S. 893 were James Charne, general
counsel, Absolute Entertainment, Inc., representing the video game industry; Gail Penner,
counsel, Autodesk, Inc., representing the Software Publishers Association; EdwardJ. Black,
vice president and general counsel, Computer & Communications Industry Association,
representing computer manufactures; and David M. Ostfeld, chairman, Institute of Electri-
cal & Electronics Engineers, Inc., United States Activities, representing electrical and com-
puter engineers. Charne and Penner endorsed S. 893, whereas, Black and Ostfeld
expressed concern that felony provisions might be misapplied to ordinary business dis-
putes and situations involving reverse engineering. Reverse engineering is defined as:
[A] method of analyzing a product in which the finished item is studied to determine
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ing, the Subcommittee Chairman, Representative William Hughes (D-
NJ), proposed an amendment in the nature of a substitute to Senate
Bill 893.70 Rather than adopting a piecemeal approach to copyright
legislation and simply adding computer programs to the list of works
whose infringement rise to felony penalties, Representative Hughes
suggested that felony provisions should apply to willful infringement
of all types of copyrighted works. 71 Representative Hughes also rec-
ommended altering the numerical thresholds that must be satisfied
before felony liability might be imposed.72 Representative Hughes'
amendment, in the nature of a substitute, received the endorsement
of the proponents of Senate Bill 893, and upon approval in Confer-
ence, became the Copyright Felony Act.
This most recent amendment to the Copyright Act in 1992 fur-
ther increased the criminal sanctions and lowered the numerical
thresholds for copyright infringement.73 Offenders convicted under
the Copyright Act for the first time may be imprisoned for up to five
years74 or fined up to $250,000 (individuals), $500,000 (organiza-
tions),75 or twice the gains from the offense 76 if the offense consists of
the reproduction or distribution during a 180-day period of at least
ten copies with a retail value of more than $2,500. 77 If the offender
has been convicted under the statute previously, the maximum prison
sentence increases to ten years.78 The Copyright Act also prescribes a
misdemeanor sentence of up to one year for any criminal copyright
infringement failing to reach the numerical thresholds described
its makeup or component parts, typically for the purpose of creating a copy or a com-
petitive product-for example, studying a completed ROM chip to determine its pro-
gramming or studying a new computer system to learn about its design.
MIcRosoFr PREss COMPUTER DIcrIoNARY 300 (1st ed. 1991), quoted in Lawrence D. Graham
& Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., Economically Efficient Treatment of Computer Software: Reverse Engineer-
ing, Protection, and Disclosure, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 63 n.3 (1996) (exam-
ining the appropriate level of protection for software in general, and the value of reverse
engineering in particular).
70 See H.R. REP. No. 102-997, 102d Cong., at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3569.
71 Id. ("[t]he substitute harmonizes the felony provisions in section 2319 to apply to all
types of copyrighted works, as is currently the case for misdemeanor violations.").
72 Id.
73 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1995). Section 506 also addresses other criminal
activities related to copyrights such as fraudulent use of copyright notice, fraudulent re-
moval of copyright notice, and false representation in connection with a copyright applica-
tion. 17 U.S.C. § 506(c)-(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1995).
74 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1) (1994).
75 18 U.S.C. § 357(b)-(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1995).
76 Id. § 357(d).
77 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (1) (1994).
78 Id. § 2319(b) (2).
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above. 79 Finally, § 506(b) continues to mandate the forfeiture and
destruction of infringing items and all implements, devices, or equip-
ment used in their manufacture.80
What drove these changes in federal copyright law? The legisla-
tive history demonstrates that industry specific interest groups were
instrumental in driving the shift from copyright law based on misde-
meanor penalties to one based on felony sanctions. Thus, the more
fundamental question becomes, why was there so much interest group
activity? Why were interest groups so involved during the amend-
ments to the copyright law, but when Congress adopted general crimi-
nal deterrence measures such as the Sentencing Guidelines? In
addition, why did these interests start to pursue increased criminal
sanctions during the 197 0s and 1980s, as opposed to the 1910s and
1920s, or at any other juncture? Lastly, why did these interests seek
criminal sanctions rather than other forms of penalties or, in the
traditional interest group manner, subsidies or tax advantages?
Most legal commentators who have examined the legislative his-
tory of various amendments and alterations to the copyright law have
been reluctant to develop a model which has explanatory and predica-
tive power. For example, Professor Litman, after criticizing the mar-
ket model adopted by legal economists, stated that she "offer[ed] no
•.. competing model."8' This non-systematic approach contrasts with
the work done by public choice theorists in other legislative contexts.
They have developed a parsimonious model-the rent seeking
model-which has explanatory and predictive power. The remainder
of the Comment attempts to facilitate the same analytical approach
used by public choice theorists, and apply it to the criminal law
context.
III. THE RENT SEEKING MODEL
A. ECONOMIC RENT IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET
An economic rent is that part of the payment to an owner of a
resource over and above that which the resource could command in
its next highest use, that is, payment greater than the opportunity
cost.8 2 For example, a lawyer earning $70,000 whose only alternative
occupation is being a paralegal for $30,000 yields an economic rent of
$40,000. There would, however, seem to be no allocative necessity for
79 Id. § 2319(b) (3).
80 17 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994).
81 Litman, supra note 34, at 881.
82 James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE
RENT-SEEKING SocIETY, supra note 4, at 5.
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such excess. 83 The resource (good, skill, service etc.) would have
been directed toward the observed employment for any payment
above cost, even an infinitesimally smaller sum. 8 4 The lawyer would
remain in his current position even if paid only $30,100. For our pur-
poses, and the definition which is most commonly referred to, a firm
making excess profits is earning economic rent.
85
In an ordered market structure, the potential attractiveness of
economic rents serves an important function. It offers the motivation
to resource owners and entrepreneurs who combine resources into
production.86 By constantly seeking new opportunities to earn eco-
nomic rent and to exploit more fully existing opportunities, profit-
seeking entrepreneurs generate a dynamic process of continuous re-
source reallocation that ensures economic growth and development.8
7
Economic rents are dissipated as the market adjusts to new and
emerging opportunities. 88 Imagine an entrepreneur discovers a use
for a resource that had not been previously used. The entrepreneur
organizes production and commences sale of the new product or ser-
vice. Due to his initiative, the entrepreneur is a pure monopolist and
can, consequently, charge a monopoly price. In a competitive market,
the entrepreneur realizes quasi-rent. Quasi-rent is the excess made in
the short run by an entrepreneur/firm from the difference between
the selling price and the variable cost of production. 89 For example,
suppose a firm can make pens at a cost of 10 cents in labor and raw
materials, and can sell them for 40 cents. A quasi-rent of 30 cents is
earned. This is not, however, the profit of the firm because there are
costs of other inputs which have to be covered by sales, even though
they do not add to the cost of making extra pens, such as the initial
investment in the factory where the pens are manufactured.
Quasi-rent, therefore, is analogous to economic rent because it
83 Id
84 Id.
85 Two types of profits are distinguished in economics. Normal or accounting profit is
the opportunity cost of the entrepreneur, that is, the minimum amount necessary to attract
him to an activity or to induce him to remain in the activity. Super-normal economic
profit is any profit over and above normal profit. Super-normal profit will be earned only
in the short run and is a return to monopoly power, which, unless there are barriers to
entry, will be dissipated by new entrants into the market. See infra notes 95-107 and accom-
panying text. See also GRAHAM BANNOCK ET AL., THE PENGUIN DIcTIoNARY OF ECONOMIcs
345 (5th ed. 1992).
86 Buchanan, supra note 82, at 5.
87 Id
88 Id.
89 BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 85, at 355. For an interesting analysis of potentially ap-
propriable quasi-rents, see Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcON. 297 (1978).
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represents a return in excess of that necessary to keep the firm in
production. It differs from economic rent, however, in that it is a tem-
porary phenomenon. It can exist because, in the short run, price may
differ from marginal cost as firms take time to enter the market and
reduce excess profits. In other words, in a competitive market, the
entrepreneur is only a short term monopolist.90 The fact that the in-
novating entrepreneur is observed to be receiving quasi-rent conveys
information to other non-innovating but potentially imitating produ-
cers of the product or service. 91
Assuming no barriers to entry, other producers enter the market
and sell the new product or a close substitute which causes output to
expand and the price to drop.92 The initial monopoly position, and
hence the quasi-rent of the innovator is dissipated to the benefit of
consumers generally.93 Therefore, rents received by producers are
eroded in the dynamics of competitive market adjustment and re-
sources come to be allocated efficiently between the producer of the
new product and other uses in the economy.94
B. RENT SEEKING: CREATING UNCOMPET IV MARKETS
The above discussion conveniently assumed away restrictions
upon entry. Producers, however, have an incentive to seek such re-
strictions. If a producer successfully bars entry into his market, then
he can earn monopoly rents for an indefinite period. The producer
does not need to invest resources into new modes of production in
order to reduce costs or improve upon the use of existing resources,
rather he can rely on barriers on entry to realize economic rent.
Figure I is useful for demonstrating this point.95 When the mar-
ket price rises from the competitive level (Pc) to the monopoly price
(Pm), consumers who continue to purchase the seller's product at the
new higher price suffer a loss (L), exactly offset by the additional reve-
nues that the seller obtains at the higher price. Thus, consumer's loss
(L) is exactly equal to the producer's gain (the economic rent). In
the language of economists, consumer surplus has been transferred
into producer surplus.96 Those who stop buying the product suffer a
90 Buchanan, supra note 82, at 5.




95 The graph is adapted from Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regula-
tion, in TowARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 72.
96 Consumer surplus is the amount by which consumers value a product over and above
what they pay for it. This term was coined by Alfred Marshall who explained it as follows:
The price which a person pays for a thing can never exceed and seldom comes up to
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loss, (D), not offset by any gain to the seller. This is the "deadweight
loss" from uncompetitive pricing, and in traditional microeconomic
analysis it is the only social cost, L being regarded merely as a transfer
from consumers to producers. 97 However, as discussed in greater de-
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A producer can realize monopoly rents in one of four ways. First,
a producer can discover a new product or a new method of making a
product. The producer, due to his initiative, may be able to earn
quasi-rents. However, as discussed above, quasi-rent differs from mo-
nopoly rent in that the former is only a short term phenomenon. As
firms enter the market, these quasi-rents are dissipated.
Second, a producer may seek to monopolize the market. If there
that which he would be willing to pay rather than go without it: so that the satisfaction
which he gets from its purchase generally exceeds that which he gives up in paying
away its price: and he thus derives from the purchase a surplus of satisfaction. The
excess of the price which he would be willing to pay rather than go without the thing,
over that which he actually does pay, is the economic measure of this surplus
satisfaction.
BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 85, at 84-85. Producer surplus is the excess of the revenue
received by the supplier of a product or service over the minimum amount he would be
willing to accept to maintain the same level of supply. Id. at 343.
97 A.C. Harberger, Using the Resources at Hand More Effectively, 49 AM. ECON. REv. 134
(1959) (examining the welfare impact of tariffs).
98 See Tullock, Welfare Costs, supra note 2. See also Krueger, supra note 2; Posner, supra
note 95, ait 71.
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are economies of scale to be gained,99 then the producer can expand
production so as to produce at the bottom of the average cost curve.
But, as is often the case, firms which enjoy economies of scale are
often price-regulated. 100 Further, there is the problem of contestable
natural monopolies. 1 1 For instance, given the economies, it may ben-
efit only one airline to serve the route between Chicago and Gary,
Indiana. But if the airline increases the price in order to earn monop-
oly rents, a second airline may move into the route and attract the
disgruntled customers. The second airline can do so because the mar-
ginal cost of transferring an existing airline route is minimal. Even if
a producer does not enjoy economies, it may still seek to increase mar-
ket power, but there remains the problem of market entry from po-
tential competitors.
Third, monopoly rents can be realized through the creation of a
cartel, whereby a number of companies producing a particular prod-
uctjoin together and restrict production. Assuming a fairly inelastic
demand, 10 2 profits for each firm will increase. 103 OPEC (Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries) during the 1970s provides a
good example of a cartel. 10 4 From the cartel's perspective there are
99 Economies of scale exist when factors which cause the average cost of producing a
commodity to fall as output of the commodity rises. For instance, a firm or industry which
would less than double its costs, if it doubled its output, enjoys economies of scale. Thus,
such firms or industry are characterized by falling average cost curves. BANNOCK ET AL.,
supra note 85, at 130-31.
100 Harold Demsetz argues, however, that firms or industries which enjoy economies
need not be regulated in the traditional manner, that is, through price controls. Rather,
governmental regulatory bodies should adopt a process of bidding, rather like the current
approach adopted by governmental bodies for other standard services such as ambulance
services, road construction and so on. If a natural monopoly attempts to earn monopoly
rents, then the governmental authority should bid the work out to other parties. Such a
process would keep the price above marginal cost, but below the monopoly price. Harold
Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968).
101 See WILLAM J. BAUMOL Er AL., CoNrESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSrRY
STRUCTURE (1982); Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of
Contestable Marhets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111 (1984).
102 The price elasticity of a demand or a supply curve is defined as the percentage
change in quantity divided the percentage change in price. For example, an inelastic de-
mand means a large change in price results in only a small change in quantity. By contrast,
an elastic demand means a small change in price results in a large change in quantity. The
two extremes are perfectly elastic (a horizontal supply or demand curve) and perfectly
inelastic (a vertical supply or demand curve). DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY. AN INTER-
MEDIATE TEXT 160 (2d ed. 1990).
103 Elasticity of demand is important when examining the amount resources devoted to
securing a (public or private) monopoly or cartel. A given industry or firm will be less
enthusiastic about restrictions on entry when the demand for the industry is highly elastic.
Resources devoted to monopolization yield a low rate of return because price cannot be
increased without a significant fall in consumer demand. Peltzman, supra note 40.
104 WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 226 n.1 (1990). See also Ian
Ayres &John Braithwaite, Partial-Industy Regulation: A Monapsony Standard for ConsumerPro-
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two problems. First, there is still the problem of entry. Second, within
the cartel framework a free rider problem exists. 10 5 There is a direct
incentive for a firm to lower its prices in order to gain an even larger
share of the super-normal profits. This leads all firms to lower their
prices in order to prevent losing market share. Therefore, each com-
pany is worse off (although the consumer is better off) due to the free
rider. Again OPEC provides a solid example of the free rider problem
destroying a cartel. 10 6
Thus, a firm has an incentive to seek a government conferred
monopoly in order to avoid the problems of entry and/or the free
rider problem. If a firm can gain a legal monopoly via governmental
mechanisms, then the firm can realize monopoly rents without the
threat of entry or competition. This constitutes the fourth way a firm
can realize monopoly rents. In Figure 2, a firm will produce at Qc and
price at Pc in a competitive market. If the firm achieves a governmen-
tally sanctioned monopoly, then it can maximize profits by producing
where marginal cost (MC) intersects marginal revenue (MR), thereby
charging Pm. The firm earns monopoly rents, R. Therefore, rent
seeking is defined as the "collusive pursuit by producers of restrictions
on competition that transfer consumer surplus into producer
surplus. ''107
tection, 80 CAL. L. REv. 13, 38-43 (1992).
105 For an explanation of the free rider problem, see infra note 131 and accompanying
text.
106 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 104, at 38-39:
After thirteen years of successful collusion, the oil cartel of the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) disintegrated in 1986. The cartel dissolved when
price chiseling by individual member nations instigated a price war that more than
halved the price of oil. The instability of OPEC was brought on in part by the down-
turn in United States demand for oil. With reduced demand, some OPEC members
could no longer stay within their OPEC production quota and still generate the reve-
nues required for domestic programs. To increase revenues, the poorest oil-exporting
nations began to cut the cartel price in an effort to regain some lost demand.
See also Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM.
L. REv. 295, 314-16 (1987).
107 Gordon Tullock, The Cost of Special Privilege, in PERSPECrrws ON Pos-rivrE PoLMcAL
EcONOMY 199 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1984).
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Rent seeking does not, however, result in a straight transfer of
consumer surplus to producer surplus.108 There are substantial dead-
weight losses associated with the unproductive search for rents via gov-
ernmentally sanctioned barriers to entry. Dead-weight loss is the net
loss of consumer surplus which occurs when rent seeking is successful
in transferring consumer surplus into producer surplus. 10 9 Dead
weight losses emerge for three possible reasons. First, the full con-
sumer demand is not satisfied thus resulting in the classic monopoly
welfare loss triangle, D, in Figures 1 and 2. Second, and moreover,
resources are expended in the search for restrictions on entry. Specif-
ically, resources will be invested until rates of return are similar to
other investments. If a computer software manufacturer can yield a
better rate of return investing time and money in Washington (i.e.,
lobbying) than developing better modes of production or more effec-
tive products, then he will not invest in a new mode of production but
instead put resources into congressional lobbying. Such expenditures
constitute net social waste.
In the context of copyrights and patents, there is a third way by
108 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
109 Discussion with Professor Patrick Dunleavy, Dep't of Gov't, London School of Eco-
nomics & Political Science (Dec. 1, 1993). For an interesting overview and critique of the
traditional public choice model regarding interest group behavior see PATRICK DUNLEAVY,




which rent seeking dissipates rents and results in dead weight loss.
Yoram Barzel argues that competition between potential innovators to
obtain property rights (and rents) from innovations can result in pre-
mature applications of the discoveries. 110 The argument can be most
effectively displayed graphically."1 In Figure 3, Y is the discounted
flow of benefits from innovation and X is the opportunity cost, that is,
the value of the resources used elsewhere. 112 If the investment in the
innovation is delayed from t to t + 1, the cost saving is the interest that
the capital earns elsewhere in the economy.113 At any date earlier
than t(m), the innovator's costs per unit of time will be larger than his
benefit, thus he is better off not to undertake the investment so
early. 114 Conversely, at any date later than t(m) the benefits per unit
of time will be larger than the costs, and he could have maximized
profits by advancing the date of his investment activity." 5 At t(m),
benefits are equal to cost, and this is the profit maximizing date." 6
FIGURE 3
Value discounted
to present value X
t (z) t (m) Time
The possibility of obtaining a patent or copyright, however, offers
110 Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 Rxv. ECON. & STAT. 348 (1968).
Although Barzel used this model to posit behavior of those seeking patents, the same logic
can be expanded to copyrights because both confer on the innovator a monopoly position
and the opportunity to capture the full stream of future income that accrue from the
innovation. See also Terry L. Anderson & PeterJ. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33 J.L. &
EcoN. 177 (1990); David D. Haddock, First Possession Versus Optimal Timing: Limiting the
Dissipation of Economic Value, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 775 (1986) (arguing that title by first posses-
sion causes premature occupation through a process of racing, and such racing results in
the partial or complete marginal rent dissipation).
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the innovator an incentive to release his innovation earlier than the
profit maximizing date. This incentive arises because the first innova-
tor to obtain the coveted patent or copyright can capture the full
stream of future income. Thus, a profit maximizing innovator will re-
lease the innovation just prior to t(m), thereby gaining the monopoly
before any other innovator. But the problem is that each innovator
will act in such a manner and the innovation will be released at t(z).
This phenomenon is "racing," namely, racing between competitors in
order to gain the monopoly and capture the future stream of income
from the innovation. Such racing dissipates all the rents and the inno-
vation is not released when socially optimal.'1 7
C. SEEKING RENT IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET VERSUS RENT SEEKING
It is important to clarify the difference in effect between the seek-
ing of economic rent in a competitive market and rent seeking, that is,
the creation of uncompetitive markets via legally sanctioned monopo-
lies or restrictions on production. The seeking of rent, as argued
above, ensures the efficient allocation of resources. Entrepreneurs,
through the constant search of economic rents, seek to create inven-
tions or improvements on current forms of production. For their ef-
forts they earn quasi-rents. But this is a short term phenomenon.
Entrants soon enter the market and the quasi-rents are dissipated.
Full consumer demand is satisfied and accordingly no net dead weight
loss is generated. Quantity and price are at competitive levels which
are Qc and Pc in Figure 2, respectively.
By contrast, rent seeking results in the sub-optimal allocation of
resources. Indeed, as the analysis above suggests, not only is no net
value generated, but net value is actually destroyed. If an entrepre-
neur can gain a legally sanctioned monopoly, then entry into the mar-
ket is barred and monopoly rents are not dissipated. Full consumer
demand is not satisfied, creating the classic welfare loss triangle.
Moreover, the entrepreneur had to expend valuable resources in ob-
taining the monopoly. These resources which could have been in-
vested elsewhere in new forms of production or innovation were
instead spent lobbying government officials. Gordon Tullock has
analogized this wasteful allocation of resources to building tunnels
117 As an example of this phenomenon, software companies often release programs pre-
maturely. SeeJames Gleick, Making Microsoft Safe for Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1995
(Magazine), at 50 ("Microsoft knows that the technologically perfect product is rarely the
same as the winning product. Time and again its strategy has been to enter a market fast




that lead nowhere. 118
Further, rent seeking does not generally involve a single interest
attempting to gain the monopoly "right." Prior to the granting of the
monopoly; other producers have competed for the same advanta-
geous position. Then, once the monopoly is granted, other interests
do not sit passively by. Rather, they continue their rent seeking ef-
forts. All these expenditures do not produce any new product, nor
are they used to develop more efficient modes of production. They
have been used to gain an advantageous position over the production
of a single product or service. Professor Buchanan effectively high-
lights the distinction between rent seeking and seeking of rents in the
competitive market:
Rent seeking on the part of potential entrants in a setting where entry is
either blocked or at best reflect one-for-one substitution must generate
social waste. Resources devoted to [gaining the monopoly] might be
used to produce valued goods and services elsewhere in the economy,
whereas nothing of net value is created by rent seeking. In the competi-
tive market, by comparison, resources of potential entrants are shifted
directly into the production of the previously monopolized commodity
or service, or close substitutes; in this usage, these resources are more
productive than they would have in alternative employment.119
Until this point, rent seeking has been assumed to mean competi-
tion for legal monopolies. But rent seeking is not so narrow. There
are a large number of government entitlements beyond legal monop-
olies that are valuable to the holder. Examples include licenses, quo-
tas, permits, authorizations, approvals (such as zoning), and franchise
agreements. 120 These are valuable to the holder because it generally
confers on them a valuable "right' to engage in a certain activity to
the exclusion of others. The creation of such scarcity implies the po-
tential emergence of rents, which, in turn, generates rent seeking ac-
tivity.121 As with the pursuit of legal monopolies, interest groups will
invest scare resources in attempts to secure either the initial assign-
ment of "rights" to these opportunities or replacement assignments as
other initial holders are ousted from privileged positions. 122 In both
cases, and despite rational investment ex ante, valuable resources will
be wasted in the process.123
118 Tullock, Welfare Costs, supra note 2, at 225.
119 Buchanan, supra note 82, at 8.
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IV. THE ECONOMICS OF COPYIGHT
Whether the current system of copyright law is good, bad or indif-
ferent is largely beyond the scope of this Comment. For example,
some economists have argued that copyrights are necessary to spur
creative works, 124 and others have argued that copyrights merely bene-
fit the holder to the detriment of the consumer.125 Which view is cor-
rect is not essential for the Comment's thesis. Regardless of whether
the are necessary or not, copyrights offer substantial benefits (eco-
nomic rent) to the holder. The apparent economic value of these
governmentally conferred entitlements generates rent seeking activity.
Such activity, as exemplified in the context of the premature applica-
tion of discoveries, results in rent dissipation. 126
Therefore, the primary purpose of the analysis is not to deter-
mine whether copyrights are the most effective mechanism for ensur-
ing innovation of creative works, but rather, the purpose is to posit the
reason for the emergence of criminal sanctions in an area of law
where civil remedies had historically been evoked. The specific thesis
is that this shift in policy was driven by interest groups seeking copy-
rights protected by criminal sanctions as a means of realizing eco-
nomic rents. While the self interested action taken by these groups
may provide socially beneficial outcomes, namely, Adam Smith's invis-
ible hand working through the political market place, these social
benefits are purely incidental to the main goal of these groups: wealth
maximization. 127
124 For the arguments in favor of copyright protection, see infra Part IVA
125 For the arguments against copyright protection, see infra Part IV. B.
126 As Professor Haddock observes:
Securing possession of an entitlement is costly, and the resources expended have alter-
native uses[.] ... It does not matter whether the entitlement is a "free" student ticket
to a college football game, which (if the team is popular) induces wasteful pre-dawn
occupation of places in line at the ticket office; a patent or copyright; a "free" farm on
the frontier; a legal monopoly over the provision of cable services; or lobsters taken
from the sea. The anticipation of capturing property of future value induces aban-
donment of alternative pursuits of positive current productivity.... If there are no
restraints, a rent-seeking race to establish title ensues. At the margin, expenditures to
capture title will equal the value of the assets whose title is sought, so marginal rents
are completely dissipated.
Haddock, supra note 110, at 777-78. See also Anderson & Hill, supra note 110, at 177
("[wlhen property rights and the rents therefrom are 'up for grabs,' it is possible for ex-
penditures to establish rights to fully dissipate the rents, leaving the efficiency gains from
privatization in question").
127 It might be argued at this point if rent seeking results in societal dead weight loss,
then how can there be benefits derived from the action of these rent seeking interest
groups? The answer lies in an Demsetzian notion of efficiency. Harold Demsetz, Informa-
lion and Efficiency: Another Vitwpoin4 12J. L. & ECON. 1 (1969). Demsetz argued that econo-
mists often suffer from the "nirvana fallacy," that is, comparing existing "imperfect"
institutional arrangements to some ideal norm. I. But rather than adopting the nirvana
fallacy, economists should compare the various institutional arrangements, and label as
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As a secondary purpose, the analysis attempts to demonstrate that
the emergence of the current system of copyright law was not costless;
specifically, creating legal monopoly rights generates incentives for in-
novators to expend resources in the search of these entitlements.
This suggests that in certain cases the cost of legislating criminal sanc-
tions for certain copyrighted material may exceed the benefits. It may
be entirely accurate to assert that copyrights are necessary to spur in-
novation, but it is important to recognize that such a system has its
costs, and future adjustments to the criminal law will occur in an inter-
est group environment. The implications from such analysis suggest
that an all-or-nothing, across-the-board approach could be undesir-
able, and instead each discrete area of copyright might require differ-
ent degrees of monopoly protection and different remedies for
infringement, that is, civil rather than criminal. Given the above pa-
rameters, it is nonetheless necessary to briefly give an overview of the
economics of intellectual property and the varying arguments in favor
of and against copyrights. 28
A. THOSE FOR COPYRIGHTS
12 9
A distinguishing feature of intellectual property is its nature as a
public good.' 30 In the case of copyrighted material, the ability to ex-
clude others once the product is made available may be infeasible.
Therefore, copyrights enable others to appropriate the benefits with-
out incurring the costs. These people are said to be free riding. 131 If
"efficient" the one that offers the most benefits. Id. See also GORDON TULLOCK, THE NEw
FEDERALIST 18 (1994) ("[h]uman institutions are imperfect, government is imperfect, and
the market is imperfect[.] . . . It is wise to select the best among a number of possible
alternatives, none of which is perfect.").
In this respect, the existing system of copyrights might be necessary to spur innova-
tion. See infra Part IV.A. But, as has been consistently argued, this Comment is not at-
tempting to make an institutional comparison between a system of copyrights or the free
market and determine which of the two should be deemed efficient. Rather, the Com-
ment attempts to show that the current system of copyrights generates the possibility of
monopoly rents. Interest groups will attempt to gain these rents through rent seeking.
Such activity results in social dead weight loss. See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying
text. The costs may be outweighed by the advantages of copyright. But that is a different
article.
128 For an overview of the literature, past and present, on the scope of patents and copy-
rights, see Steven N. S. Cheung, Property Rights and Invention, 8 RES. LAw & ECON. 5 (1986).
129 This section owes much to William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
130 "Public good" is used here in the technical, economic sense. See supra note 5.
131 The free riding problem arises in many situations. Basically, no individual is willing
to contribute towards the cost of something when he hopes that someone else will bear the
cost instead. See generally OLSON, supra note 5 (discussing motivations behind collective
action). As mention above, the problem arises whenever there is a public good. Id. For
example, everyone in an apartment block may want a faulty light repaired, but no one
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enough people free ride, then there is no economic incentive for the
innovator to release his product. If the copies made by the original
innovator are at or close to marginal cost, then others may be discour-
aged from free riding (that is, making copies), but the innovator's
total revenues may not be sufficient to cover the costs of creating the
work. Thus, according to Landes and Posner, "[c]opyright protec-
tion-the right of the copyright's owner to prevent others from copy-
ing-trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against the
benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first
place." 3 2
Landes and Posner posit that the cost of producing a copyright-
able work such as a book has two components. 33 The first is the cost
of creating the work which is fixed for it does not vary with the
number of copies produced or sold.'34 It consists of the author's time
and effort plus the cost of the publisher, of soliciting and editing the
manuscript and setting it in type.'35 Posner and Landes called these
fixed costs the "cost of expression."'36 The second component is the
variable cost of production. This cost of production a work increases
with the number of copies produced such as the cost of printing,
binding and distributing individual copies.'3 7 The cost of expression
is a sunk cost and does not enter into the making of copies because,
once the work is created, the author's efforts can be incorporated into
another copy virtually at zero cost.13 8
For a new work to be created, the expected return must exceed
the expected costs.' 39 Landes and Posner assume that the demand
wants to bear the cost of organizing the repair themselves. They would rather free ride on
the effort of someone else. Another example is when individual shareholders take little
interest in the management of their companies, hoping someone else will monitor what
the executives are doing. For more on the role of investors, see WILLIAM L. CAaRv & MEL,
VIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 241-54 (7th ed. 1995). For those interested in game
theory and the free rider problem, see ROBERT AXnLROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1984); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLEcrIVE AcTION (1982); Russell Hardin, Collective Action as an
Agreeable Prisoners'Diemma, 16 BEH. Sci. 472 (1971).
132 Landes & Posner, supra note 129, at 326.133 Id.
134 1d




139 Id. Landes and Posner assume that revenues are raised "typically, and we shall as-
sume exclusively, from the sale of copies." Id. at 327. Such an assumption, however, is very
narrow. As will be discussed below, many products which have public good characteristics
can be marketed in such a manner that revenue does not come from the actual sale of the
product. For example, once radio waves are produced, it is largely infeasible to restrict
access, and given the Landes and Posner argument, radio stations could not make revenue
unless they have a copyright or some means of restriction such as a mandatory toll. Yet
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curve is negatively sloping (as in Figures 1 and 2) because there are
good but not perfect substitutes for a given book.1 40 Due to the cost
of expression,
[t] he creator will make copies up to the point where the marginal cost of
one more copy equals its expected marginal revenue. The resulting dif-
ference between price and marginal cost, summed over the number of
copies sold, will generate revenues to offset the cost of expression. 41
Since the decision to create the work is made before the demand for
the copies is known, the work will be created only if the difference
between expected revenues and the cost of making the copies equals
or exceeds the cost of expression.1 42 Graphically, using Figure 2, the
variable cost of making copies is the MC curve, and the fixed cost of
expression is the difference between the MC curve and Pm, thus, reve-
nues need in order to cover the cost of expression is R. Any price
below Pm, the work will not be produced.
The above description assumed the existence of copyright protec-
tion. In its absence, anyone can buy a copy of the book when it first
appears and make and sell copies. According to Landes and Posner,
"[t] he market price of the book will eventually be bid down to the
marginal cost of copying, with the unfortunate result that the book
probably will not be produced in the first place, because the author
and publisher will not be able to recover their cost of creating the
work."1
43
Further, there is the problem of uncertainty. Even with copyright
protection, sales may be insufficient to cover the cost of expression
and may not even cover the variable cost of making copies. 144 Thus,
the difference between the price and marginal cost of the successful
work must not only cover the cost of expression but also must com-
pensate for the risk of failure. Without the protection of copyright,
this uncertainty acts as an additional disincentive to create the
radio stations make their revenue not from the sale of their service, but rather through
advertising. Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Ap-
proach, 12 HAMLINE L. REv. 261, 277 (1989).
140 Landes & Posner, supra note 129, at 327.
141 Id.
142 Id,
143 Id. at 328.
144 In an important work, Kenneth Arrow acknowledges that the patent system (and by
implication copyrights) will encourage invention. However, he notes three reasons for the
failure to achieve "optimality" in these activities: uncertainty, indivisibility and inap-
propriability. Because of these factors, government intervention is required by investing in
R&D in order to ensure an optimal level of innovation. KENNETH J. ARRow, Economic Wel-
fare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in KENNETH J. ARROW, THE RATE AN DimEc-
TION OF INvENTIVE Acrrvrry 609, 609-25 (1962). For a sharp criticism of Arrow's definition
of "optimality" as the quintessential "nirvana fallacy," see Demsetz, supra note 127.
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work.145
Thus, according to Landes and Posner as well as other propo-
nents of copyright protection, the system is necessary in order to offer
incentives for innovators to produce works which would not be pro-
duced without such protection. Most proponents of the copyright sys-
tem accept that there are costs associated with such monopoly
protection, but nonetheless, on aggregate, the benefits outweigh the
costs.14 6 As the next section indicates, there remain a number of
economists who posit that copyrights are actually unnecessary and, in-
deed, detrimental.
B. THOSE AGAINST COPYRIGHTS
Critics of copyright protection argue that creators of traditionally
copyrighted works can gain sufficient revenues through a variety of
market mechanisms without having to resort to governmentally con-
ferred monopoly rights.147 These critics initially focus on the concept
of publicness: "publicness is an attribute of institutions, not of abstract
economic goods. Every good can be made more or less public by ex-
amining it in different institutional contexts."' 48 The public good na-
ture of a product is often determined, not by the good itself, but
rather the way in which it is provided on the market. 149
Movie theaters, for example, invest in exclusion devices like ticket win-
dows, walls and ushers, all designed to exclude potential free riders from
enjoyment of the service.' 50 "Drive-ins," faced with the prospect of free
riders peering over walls, installed-at considerable expense-individ-
ual speakers for each car, thus rendering the publicly available visual
part of the movie of little interest.151
According to Palmer,
145 Landes & Posner, supra note 129, at 329.
146 See reservations in Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281, 291-308 (1970). But see
Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection forPublished Books: A Reply to
Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REv. 1100 (1971).
147 This section owes much to Palmer, supra note 139.
148 Tyler Gowen, Public Goods and Their Institutional Context: A Critic of Public Goods Theory,
43 REv. Soc. ECON. 53 (1985).
149 As Kenneth Goldin argues:
The evidence suggests that we are not faced with a set of goods and services which
have the inherent characteristics of public goods. Rather, we are faced with an una-
voidable choice regarding every good or service: shall everyone have equal access to
that service (in which case the service will be similar to a public good) or shall the
service be available selectively: to some but not to others? In practice, public good
theory is often used in such a way that one overlooks this important choice problem.
Kenneth Goldin, Equal Access vs. Selective Access: A Critique of Public Goods Theory, 29 PUB.
CHoIcE 53 (1977) (emphasis omitted), quoted in Palmer, supra note 139, at 284.




[t]he costs of exclusion are involved in the production of virtually every
good imaginable. There is no compelling justification for singling out
some goods and insisting that the state underwrite their production, sim-
ply because of a decision to make the good available on a nonexclusive
basis. This decision is itself the relevant factor in converting a potential
private good into a public good. 15 2
Thus, "[e]xclusion devices should be seen as endogenous to the mar-
ket, as a regular part of its operation." 153 What follows is a list of prac-
tical exclusion mechanisms for providing traditionally copyrighted
goods without recourse to copyright protection.154
First, there are marketing strategies such as being the "first to
market."' 55 During this period the original creator will not face com-
petition and thus can earn quasi-rents until competitors enter the
market.156 This seems particularly true for products which have a rela-
tively short market life such as a variety of software packages which are
constantly being upgraded. 15 7 There is also the possibility of price
discrimination.1 58 For example, a publisher of academic journals may
capture part of the value that individuals obtain from copying articles
by charging a higher price for the journal-especially to libraries. 15 9
In the case of videocassettes, producers have been able to engage in
temporal price discrimination, initially offering movies at high prices
to enthusiasts (who have a relatively inelastic demand) or to rental
store owners (who will rent the movie many times), then dropping the
prices after several months to capture less enthusiastic segments of the
market.
Secondly, non-purchasers can be excluded from enjoying a good
by "bund[ling] it together with another good, for which the cost of
152 Id. at 285.
153 Id.
154 This is not meant to be, by any account, an exhaustive list. Rather, it attempts merely
to offer a flavor of the arguments being proposed by the critics of the copyright system of
protection.
155 See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 139, at 295; Landes & Posner, supra note 129, at 330;
Breyer, supra note 146, at 299-302.
156 As a point of conjecture, it would seem reasonable to suggest that Microsoft would
have received sufficient revenues to offset the cost of expression within a short time of
placing Windows 95 on the market.
157 See Graham & Zerbe, supra note 69, at 68-69 ("the pace of advancement in the com-
puter industry has resulted in a very short shelf life for software products. By the time a
second developer's product is on the market, the first developer may have already an up-
graded version of its product."). On average, a new software product becomes antiquated
in less than two years. Id. at 69 n.32.
158 Palmer, supra note 139, at 295.
159 This point is stressed by S. J. Liebowitz, Photocopying and Price Discrimination, 8 J. Rxs.
L. & EcoN. 181 (1986); S.J. Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying Jour-
nals, 93J. POL. EcoN. 945 (1983).
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exclusion may be lower.' 60 This bundled good can either be comple-
mentary to the public good, such as program guides sold in conjunc-
tion with television broadcasts, or noncomplementary but appealing
to market segments that are sufficiently coextensive, such as health
insurance through the Farm Bureau, which also provides the public
good of lobbying for farm programs that benefit all farmers. 161 Com-
puter programs may also be "bundled" together with other goods,
such as manuals, free upgrades, and toll-free numbers and passwords
that give purchasers access to expert advice on the use of the of the
program. Finally, television stations can tie one good, the broadcast
of electromagnetic signal, with another, the dissemination of informa-
tion from (excludable) sellers to potential buyers (advertising).' 62
Lastly, there are contractual alternatives to copyright protec-
tion. 163 For example, licensing the original work on the condition
that the licensee does not make copies of it or disclose it to others in a
way that would enable them to make copies.
Performance bonds can be posted . .. to ensure compliance with the
terms of a mutually agreeable contract .... Such contractual remedies
can be used in conjunction with trade secrecy law[s], which offer[s] a
broad spectrum of protection against unauthorized disclosure of any
guarded or contractually governed secret 'used in one's business and
which gives him an opportunity to gain an advantage over competitors
who do not know how to use it.' While trade secrecy laws do not offer
protection identical to patents or copyright law, there are cases where it
is preferable. 164
The example of Coca-Cola, the formula which was never patented,
indicates one of the advantages of reliance on trade secrecy laws, i.e.,
permanent in duration.
C. THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: THE NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The above discussion in subsections A and B was not meant to
offer a conclusive position on whether copyright right protection is
necessary or not. Indeed, according to Professor Priest, a review of
the economic literature on copyright reveals a remarkable dearth of
analysis:
In "Property Rights and Invention," Professor Steven Cheung usefully
reviews that classic literature on the scope of the patent right .... I use
160 Palmer, supra note 139, at 289-90.
161 For an extensive discussion on bundled noncomplementary goods, see OLSON, supra
note 5, at 132-67.
162 Benjamin Klein, Tie-Ins and the Market Provision of Collective Goods, 10 HAiv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 451, 452 (1987). See also Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods,
13J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970).
163 Palmer, supra note 139, at 291.
164 Id. at 292-93.
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the word "useful" in a slightly peculiar way: the utility of the Cheung
review lies in revealing how thin this classic literature really is. Cheung's
simplifying descriptions of the competing theories provide an unwitting
parody of what must be one of the least productive lines of inquiry in all
of economic thought. 165
The above discussion may indicate that a single unified theory on
the efficiency of copyrights requires a less all-or-nothing approach,
but instead, one which examines each discrete area of copyright law.
But one thing remains crystal clear: copyrights create economic rents.
And as Professor Mueller argues, " [t] he iron law of rent seeking is that
wherever a rent is to be found, a rent seeker will be there trying to get
it."166
V. THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL SANCTIONS TO REALIZE MONOPOLY
RENTS: APPLYING THE RENT SEEKING MODEL TO THE COPYRIGHT
LAW CONTEXT
The legislative history of the recent amendments to the Copy-
right Act demonstrates that interest groups were prevalent through-
out the process. Indeed, many of the changes in the law were the
direct result of interest group preferences.1 67 Legal theorists, how-
ever, have not provided a model which explains the motivation be-
hind these interest groups' calling for increased criminal sanctions for
copyright infringement. 168 Therefore, while applying the rent seek-
ing model to the case of copyright law, several fundamental questions
must be addressed. First, why were interests groups so prevalent in
the revisions of the copyright laws, and can such activity be expected
in other areas of the criminal law formulation process? Second, why
did this pressure increase in 19 7 0s and 1980s, as opposed to an earlier
juncture? Lastly, why did these groups pursue criminal sanctions
rather than more stringent civil sanctions? In addition to considering
the model's explanative power, it is also important to examine the
implications derived from the model, that is, the model's predicative
value.
A. INTEREST GROUP INVOLVEMENT DURING THE COPYRIGHT REVISIONS
There are considerable profits to be earned in the area of intel-
lectual property. For example, the world market for computer
165 George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lauyers About Intellectual Property: Comment
on Cheung, 8 REs. L. & ECON. 19 (1986). For the article by Steven Cheung, see supra note
128.
166 MUELLER, supra note 1, at 241.
167 See supra Part II.
168 See, e.g., Litman, supra note 34, at 881.
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software alone is currently estimated at $70 billion per year, and the
Commerce Department has predicted that this figure could increase
to $1 trillion by the year 2000.169 In a purely competitive market (that
is, one with no barriers to entry), firms can only earn quasi-rents. 170
Quasi-rents are only a short term phenomenon, however. They soon
attract firms to enter the market and dissipate the quasi-rents that the
existing firms in the market are realizing. But as previously noted, if a
firm Can restrict entry into a particular market thereby reducing com-
petition, then the firm can earn monopoly rents.171 Thus, given the
large potential economic rents in the computer software, motion pic-
ture, sound recording and other similar industries, there is a strong
incentive for the creators of intellectual property to seek some form of
protection from possible competitors.
A firm can seek barriers to entry in several ways. First, it can at-
tempt to monopolize the market for a given range of products. At-
tempts to monopolize, however, can be problematic if the monopoly
is not legally legitimate (that is, a monopoly not conferred by the gov-
ernment). Indeed, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
is currently engaged in the third major phase of an investigation into
possible antitrust violations by the Microsoft Corporation. 172 As the
Microsoft Corporation can attest, the cost of defending an alleged mo-
nopoly position can be expensive. These costs arise whether defend-
ing entry from potential competitors, or as in the case of Microsoft,
defending against a potential federal prosecution.173 Finally, a mo-
nopoly position is rarely permanent. For example, by the late 1970s
IBM dominated the computer hardware market, but its monopoly po-
sition soon evaporated once Apple began producing personal
computers.174
Second, a number of firms can create a private cartel. 175 But
given the structure of the current market for intellectual property,
cartelization is problematic. George Stigler has noted that firms want
to collude in order to restrict output and drive-up prices. 176 There
remains, however, an incentive to chisel (free ride), that is, one firm
lowering its price in order to increase market share and gain an even
larger percentage of the economic rent. 77 Thus, for a cartel to sur-
169 See S. REP. No. 102-268, at 2 (1992).
170 See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
172 See Gleick, supra note 117, at 50.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
176 See George J. Stigler, A Theoy of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
177 Id. at 46.
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vive, it must have a policing arrangement which can identify the chis-
eling firms.178 According to Professor Stigler, the ability to police the
cartel becomes problematic when the number of firms and customers
entering the market increase. 179 In the main, the current structure of
the intellectual property demonstrates these two characteristics. In
many areas there are a number of firms producing comparable goods,
such as in video game industry. Furthermore, the market for intellec-
tual property is increasing at a rapid rate, and new customers are con-
tinuously entering the market. Thus, the ability to chisel (free ride)
without being detected is high, and cartels would tend not to be
stable.
Therefore, in order to realize monopoly rents, firms attempt to
gain a legitimate and enforceable monopoly over the products they
produce. Copyrights serve the purpose of conferring a legitimate mo-
nopoly. Assuming no infringement, an owner of the copyright can
realize the full stream of future revenue from the copyrighted work.' 80
The amount of the potential economic rent and the ability of the firm
to capture this rent offers an incentive to overcome the Olsonian free
rider problem. 81 Once the free rider problem is overcome, industry
specific interest groups can mobilize and lobby Congress. Thus, the
reason for interest group activity in the area of copyright law is based
178 Id. See also Ayes, supra note 106.
179 Stigler, supra note 176, at 46.
180 See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
181 See supra note 131. There may be some confusion as to the use of the term free rider.
This Comment has used the term in the cartel as well as the interest group mobilization
context. They are basically two sides of the same coin. Free riding occurs whenever a
person/group can receive the benefits from the action of others and not have to sustain
the costs themselves. Free riding can both be desirable and undesirable depending on the
institutional context. For example, in the case of cartels, free riding ensures that the cartel
cannot survive. In this context, free riding dissipates monopoly rents and ensures an opti-
mal allocation of resources. By contrast, in other institutional contexts, free riding is unde-
sirable. For example, it may be beneficial that more persons mobilize and call for
increased protection of the environment, but due to free riding, the groups calling for
environmental protection remains relatively small and under-mobilized. For example,
most opinion polls conducted in the 1980s demonstrated that 70 percent of the popula-
tion thought more needed to be done about the environment, but only a small proportion
were willing to invest time and resources into the collective endeavor.
As Russell Hardin notes:
The answer... is that environmentalists contribute woefully little to their cause given
the enormous value to them of success and given the repeated survey results that show
the strong commitment of a large percentage of Americans to that cause. Environ-
mentalists annually spend less on their apparently great cause than 25,000 two-pack-a-
day smokers spend on cigarettes.
HARDIN, supra note 131, at 11. For a complete listing of survey results, see Riley E. Dunlap,
Trends in Public Opinion Towards Environmental Issues: 1965-1990, in RILEY E. DUNLAP & AN-
GELA C. MERTIG, AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE US ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 1970-
1990, 102-06 (1992).
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on the iron law of rent seeking. 82
In this respect, the motivation of interest groups in the criminal
law formulation process does not differ from interest group motiva-
tion in other legislative contexts. It is well documented by public
choice scholars that there is a high degree of interest group activity
where there are specific rents to be captured through legislative
mechanisms (i.e., legitimate monopolies or other barriers to
trade).18s For example, the tariff and import quota legislative process
is dominated by rent seeking interests attempting to create artificial
barriers to entry in order to reduce foreign competition. 84 The re-
duction in competition enables domestic producers to increase prices
without rent dissipation. 185
Similarly, if interest groups can use criminal sanctions as a means
of restricting entry into lucrative markets, they will do so. There is no
reason to suppose that rent seeking interest groups prefer non-crimi-
nal to criminal law, especially when the latter can effectively deter po-
tential competitors. It is important to note, however, that interest
groups activity will not permeate every aspect of the criminal law for-
mulation process. Interests groups, for example, will not be involved
in policies of general deterrence. The lack of interest group involve-
ment arises for two reasons. First, there are often no direct economic
benefits to be gained from enacting such policies. Second, and more-
over, even if there are economic benefits, interest groups will not mo-
bilize due to the nonexcludablilty of would-be consumers. If our
streets are safe, then we all benefit whether we lobbied or not for
more police protection or longer sentences for violent criminals. In
other words, policies of general deterrence constitute public goods, 186
and hence are subject to the free rider problem.187
Thus, interest groups will mobilize and use the criminal law for-
mulation process when there are economic benefits to gain from such
mobilization, and these benefits can be captured. In the case of copy-
rights, a firm that gains a copyright can directly enjoy the economic
benefits that accrue from that copyright. The more clearly stipulated
the copyright is, the greater its economic value. The reason being
what is viewed as a copyright from the holder's perspective is simply a
set of prohibitions and sanctions from the perspective of everyone
182 See MUELLER, supra note 1, at 241.
183 See supra note 4.
184 See Tullock, supra note 107, at 199.
185 Id.
186 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
187 For a general discussion of the free rider problem, see supra note 183.
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else. 188 Consequently, there is a direct incentive for holders and fu-
ture holders to invest resources to ensure that copyrights are clearly
stipulated and well-protected by readily observable sanctions. Ra-
tional interest groups will therefore pursue criminal sanctions as a
means of protecting their copyrights.
B. RENT SEEKING IN THE 1970s AND 1980s
Why did the various industry representatives call for more strin-
gent protection of copyrights during the 1970s and 1980s, as opposed
to an earlier period? There are two concurrent reasons for this trend:
the increase in potential economic rents and the decrease in the mar-
ginal cost of duplication. With the communication explosion during
the 1960s and 1970s, the market for intellectual property became in-
creasingly profitable. Indeed, by the 1980s, the software industry was
one of the fastest growing industries in the U.S.18 9 Such growing prof-
its offered an incentive for groups to invest more resources into secur-
ing clearly-stipulated copyrights. 190  The increase in profitable
188 Discussion with David D. Haddock, Professor of Law & Economics, Northwestern
University School of Law, Chicago, Il. (Oct. 18, 1996).
189 See Criminal Sanctions for Violations of Software Copyrights, supra note 59, at 26.
190 In other words, as copyrights become increasingly valuable, interests will expend
more resources in order to obtain them. Figure 4 demonstrates this proposition in graph
form. The graph is based on Sam Peltzman's more generalized work on regulation. See
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markets was coupled with technology that decreased the marginal cost
of duplication.' 9 ' In other words, just as profits were increasing, imi-
tators could duplicate at marginal cost and sell on the open market,
thereby dissipating the economic rent that would have been realized
by the creators.
Thus, it is not coincidental that the first main push for felony
sanctions came from the motion picture and sound recording indus-
tries. During the 1970s, the emergence of cheaper and better record-
ing equipment and the video cassette recorder (VCR) reduced the
marginal cost of duplication. 92 Accordingly, the motion picture and
sound recording industries expressed concern, and pursued increased
sanctions for copyright infringement. 93 The next push for felony
how much should the firm expend in order to obtain copyright protection. Assuming the
demand schedule is D, then the firm will produce where marginal cost (MC) intersects
marginal revenue (MR), thereby charging P. The firm will earn R. Now, if the firm can
costlessly protect the innovation, then all of R constitutes profits. But protecting an inno-
vation from appropriation is not costless, namely, the firm will have expend valuable re-
sources in order to secure a copyright. In the scenario described thus far, the firm will
expend up to R in order to secure a valid copyright. Any investment over R would result in
a net financial loss to the innovating firm.
But now assume there has been an endogenous market shift-the demand for this
particular form of intellectual property has shifted outward. The new demand schedule is
represented by D (n). If the innovator can capture this full demand, then the new profits
constitute R plus the shaded area. But if the increased demand is satisfied by appropria-
tion (i.e., copying) by the new market entrants, then the market demand to the innovator
still appears to be D rather than D (n). Thus, given the new demand, the innovator will be
willing to spend up to R plus the shaded area in order to obtain more stringent copyright
protection.
191 See Criminal Sanctions for Violation of Copyrights, supra note 59, at 26-27 ("However,
unlike [other copyright-based industries], software is exceptionally easy to reproduce.
Whereas reproduction of a good copy of a book requires a printing plant and bindery...
all that is required to make perfect copies of a computer program within a few seconds is a
standard personal computer."). See also Timothy D. Howell, Comment, Intellectual Property
Pirates: Congress Raises the Stakes in the Modern Battle to Protect Copyrights and Safeguard the
United States Economy, 27 ST. MARY's L.J. 613, 657 (1996) (observing that "[i]n many cases
... modem technology reduces copyright infringement to a task as simple as the push of a
button"); INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTuRE TASK FORCE, INTETLECrTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NA-
TIONAL INFORMATION INFRAsTRUCFURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLEC-
TuAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 12 (1995) (recognizing that modem technology enables "one
individual, with a few key strokes, to deliver perfect copies of digitized works to scores of
other individuals.").
192 See Hearings on the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act, supra note 50, at 29 (joint
statement of MPPA and RIAA) ("Audio piracy began its rapid growth in the late 1960s
when pre-recorded tape cartridges were introduced into automobiles and homes; video
piracy began in the 1970s with the introduction of videocassette recorders.").
193 Id. at 26-63. See also Teddy C. Kim, Note, Taming the Electronic Frontier: Software Copy-
right Protection in the Wake of United States v. LaMacchia, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1255, 1260 n.21
(1996) ("In the 1980s, the advent of home video recording technology allowed home view-
ers to duplicate copyright programs easily and efficiently. Concerns about infringement
led the movie industry to lobby for higher penalties for criminal infringement. Ever solici-
tous, Congress increased penalties for criminal infringement in 1982.").
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sanctions occurred during the mid-1980s when personal computers
were becoming widespread. Again, the marginal cost of duplication
was being driven down. 194 Thus, these two paradigm shifts created a
situation where the markets were more profitable, but it was becom-
ing increasingly difficult to restrict or reduce competition from unau-
thorized duplicators who were violating protected copyrights.
C. THE DESIRE FOR CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
The owners of intellectual property such as copyright holders
have an obvious incentive to protect their governmentally conferred
entitlement by pursuing civil remedies. Indeed, it was not until 1897
that Congress provided criminal sanction for those who willfully in-
fringed a copyright. And even then, it was not until the 1990s that
felony penalties were adopted across the board to cover all copyright
infringements. For many years, therefore, copyright holders relied al-
most exclusively on civil remedies. 195 It would seem, on first impres-
sion, that copyright holders would prefer more stringent civil
remedies rather than an increase in criminal sanctions. For example,
the burden of proof is higher and there is a mens rea requirement in
194 See Criminal Sanctions for Violations of Software Copyrights, supra note 59, at 27.
195 Indeed, a criticism that could be lobbied at this Comment is that the imposition of
criminal sanctions continues to remain the exception rather then the rule. See Howell,
supra note 191, at 646-47 (observing that over the last century criminal copyright laws have
broadened both in their scope and use, but the treatment of copyright infringement as a
crime still remains less utilized then traditional civil remedies); Sharon B. Soffer, Criminal
Copyright Infringement, 24 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 491 (1987) (pointing out the infrequency of
criminal copyright prosecutions in cases that are not severe). Two brief responses are war-
ranted. First, this Comment predominately focuses on the impact that interest groups
have on the legislature rather then on the courts. Second, and moreover, when the courts
fail to impose criminal sanctions in certain cases, the affected interests often return to
Congress to have the law amended in order to ensure that criminal sanctions are imposed
in future similar cases. United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994), pro-
vides a good example of this phenomenon. In LaMacchia, a federal grad jury indicted
David LaMacchia for criminal copyright infringement, stemming from his creation of a
bulletin board on the Internet from which subscribers uploaded and downloaded copies of
computer software. Although the scheme resulted in estimated losses of one million dol-
lars to the copyright holders, the court found that LaMacchia's actions were not criminal
sanctionable under § 506(a) of the Copyright Act. The reason was that there was no indi-
cation that LaMacchia had operated his computer bulletin board for "purposes of com-
mercial advantage or private financial gain." After the decision, the computer software
industry began to lobby Congress to amend the Copyright Act. In response, Congress
proposed the Criminal Copyright Improvement Act of 1995 (Improvement Act) which, if
enacted, would close the legal loopholes exposed by the LaMacchia decision. See Howell,
supra note 191, at 671 (noting that the Improvement Act has three provisions that "directly
address the issues raised by the LaMacchia fiasco, and serve the sole purpose of deterring
willful mass infringements undertaken without financial incentive."). Therefore, although
various interests cannot directly influence the court system, they can lobby to change the
Copyright Act so that future decisions are more favorable.
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criminal actions that can decrease the chances of successful prosecu-
tion. Furthermore, copyright holders do not receive any direct pecu-
niary gain from criminal prosecutions. That is, while civil fines accrue
to the plaintiff, criminal fines accrue to the federal government.
Yet despite these apparent disadvantages, there are a number of
reasons why copyright holders might prefer criminal sanctions over
civil remedies. First, criminal sanctions serve to augment civil deter-
rence. The possibilities of civil remedies alone is often insufficient to
deter potential violators who willfully infringe a protected copyright
for commercial gain.196 Indeed, civil damages actions can be seen as
just another cost of doing business. As one witness stated before the
Senate's Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks:
Civil penalties can sometimes be absorbed as a mere cost of doing busi-
ness. However, large civil penalties at most result in the collapse of an
illegal enterprise. Only criminal penalties, with jail or the prospect of
jail, are drastic enough to restrain repeated offenders and to deter the
flagrant kinds of piracy with which Congress has been concerned. 197
From the holder's perspective, the problem is that an individual can
infringe the copyright, pay the civil damages and still earn a profit on
the venture. The imposition of criminal sanctions can serve to fill this
"gap" through substantial fines and imprisonment.19
Second, criminal sanctions are a more effective deterrence then
civil remedies against judgment proof defendants. This is a common
justification for criminal sanctions, 199 but it rings particularly true
196 Hanock Gessesse & Karen Sanzaro, Intellectual Property Crimes, 33 Am. CIUM. L. REv.
839, 840 (1996).
197 See Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 99th Cong. 74 (1985)
(statement of David Ladd, former Register of Copyrights, Wiley & Rein, Washington,
D.C.). See also Gessesse & Sanzaro, supra note 196, at 840 ("[t]he possibility of civil sanc-
tions alone is insufficient to deter violators who would steal a trade secret or infringe on
another's trademark, copyright or patent. Indeed, some entrepreneurs view civil damage
actions as just another cost of doing business.").
198 Id. See also David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary
Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1990). Professor Haddock and his contributors provide
an efficiency rationale for the use of punitive sanctions:
A remedy that "makes the plaintiff whole" [that is, ordinary remedies] can create in-
centives for a defendant to bypass negotiation in favor of an outright taking. Takings
discourage investment in takeable assets and create deadweight losses, since defend-
ants spend resources to find such takeable assets and plaintiff spends resources to
protect them. Consequently, an efficient legal system often will opt for a remedy that
makes a defendant rather than a plaintiff whole [that is, extraordinary remedies]
when the defendant intentionally takes, rather than negotiates for, a property-pro-
tected entitlement.
Id. at 50.
199 Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent,
85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232 (1985). Professor Shavell argues that nonmonetary sanctions (i.e.,
imprisonment) should be employed "only where monetary sanctions cannot adequately
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given the advent of modem technologies that have made the duplica-
tion process easier and cheaper. For example, those engaged in the
unauthorized duplication of copyrighted material are often individu-
als who are using their own personal equipment. Even operations
that are larger might not be endowed with many resources beyond the
equipment used to produced the unauthorized copies. In both situa-
tions, the imposition of civil sanctions can prove ineffective because
the defendants have insufficient funds to cover the fine. Yet, criminal
sanctions in the form of imprisonment can be imposed on defendants
who are liable for large damages but have limited resources. Accord-
ingly, the traditional rationale for criminal sanctions takes on a new
urgency-at least from the holder's perspective-in the area of mod-
ern copyright infringement.
Third, the incarceration of convicted infringes ensures that they
are no longer market participants. After civil fines have been im-
posed, infringers can rapidly re-enter the market. Civil remedies do
not require that the infringing copies or the manufacturing equip-
ment used to be destroyed. But even if the trial judge in his or her
discretion decides to have the infringing copies and the manufactur-
ing equipment destroyed, the convicted individual can nonetheless
quickly re-enter the market due to low start-up costs. 200 By contrast, if
criminal sanctions in the form of imprisonment are imposed, then the
infringer is physically removed from the market (along with the in-
fringing copies and manufacturing equipment), and therefore no
longer represents a threat. In this sense, felony sanctions ensure a
form of cartelization. Market participants who charge a competitive
price are removed from the market thereby leaving just the copyright
holders who charge monopoly prices.
As a final matter, the rent seeking model, in order to prove its
worth, must also have predicative as well as explanatory power. The
main implication stemming from the model is that industry-specific
interests will continue to push for more stringent criminal sanctions.
As potential economic rents increase and the marginal costs of dupli-
deter undesirable acts." Id. at 1236. To determine whether monetary sanctions can offer
sufficient deterrence, five factors need to be examined. "One of these factors plainly is the
size of a party's assets .... In the extreme case, for instance, it is impossible to deter a
person with no assets by the threat of monetary sanctions." Id. at 1236-37.
200 In recent years, the price of duplicating equipment has decreased dramatically. See
Jayashri Srikantiah, Note, The Response of Copyright to the Enforcement Strain of Inexpensive Copy-
ing Technology, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1634, 1634 (1996) (observing that "[a]dvances in
reprographic technology have spawned inexpensive photocopiers, videotape recorders
(VTRs), modems, computers, networks, and tape recorders capable of making high-quality
copies."); Howell, supra note 191, at 657 (noting that "devices such as computers, modems,
fax machines and photocopiers are a common part of everyday life, thus rendering the
'tools' of infringement readily accessible to pirates").
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cation decrease, there will be a continued drive for more stringent
criminal sanctions. Both elements are characteristic of the current
intellectual property market. Potential economic rents are increasing,
and hence, industry-specific groups have an incentive to lobby for
more stringent protection of their copyrights. By all accounts, the
market for intellectual property is expanding rapidly, which means
larger profits and hence greater incentive to spend more resources in
securing well-protected copyright protection.
As the market for copyrighted material increases, however, new
technology causes a decrease in the marginal cost of duplication. As
the Wall Street Journal recently reported: "[n] ever, [copyright holders]
say, has there been a threat quite like the Internet. It is a medium
capable of making endless copies of material-songs, software, text,
films-at virtually no cost."20 1 The MPAA is currently calling for crim-
inal sanctions to be extended to digital copies.20 2 The Commerce De-
partment suggests that the copyright laws should be extended to cover
the content on the Internet, including a recommendation that the
infringement of more than $5,000 of copyrighted material on-line be
made a felony offense.203 Given the above, the shift towards more
stringent criminal sanctions for copyright infringement is likely to be
the trend for the foreseeable future.
VI. CONCLUSION
Copyright law has become increasingly criminally oriented. Prior
to 1976, the willful infringement of a copyright constituted, at most, a
misdemeanor penalty of not more than $1,000 and one year in prison.
By 1992, the willful infringement of a copyright constituted, at most, a
felony penalty of $250,000 and ten years in prison. The legislative his-
tory of the three recent criminal amendments to the Copyright Act
indicates that the shift in policy was not made by policy makers sitting
in a vacuum, determining the "optimal policy." Rather, the process
was driven by industry-specific interest groups.
This Comment does not posit whether such a process is, or in-
deed the results are good, bad or indifferent. Merely what this Com-
ment intended to demonstrate was that the rent seeking model-
previously only applied in the non-criminal context-was equally ap-
plicable to the criminal law formulation process. The parsimonious
model hypothesizes: wherever there is a rent, there is a rent seeker
201 Ross Kerber, Vigilant Copyright Holders Patrol the Interne4 WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1995, at
B1.
202 Mike Snider, Lifting On-Line Materia USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 1996, at DI (quoting Jack
Valenti, Motion Picture Association of America).
203 ARIz. REPUBLIC, Sept. 6, 1995, at D7.
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trying to get it. Thus, if interest groups can use criminal law mecha-
nisms in order to earn monopoly rents, the iron law applies. Criminal
law is not free from self-interested, utility maximizing groups solely
because it comes under the umbra of "criminal law." Rather the focus
should be on whether the criminal law can generate economic rents
for specific interests. If so, then it is likely that these interests will be
involved, to a high degree, in the formulation of these criminal laws.
